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In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
SUGARHOUSE FINANCE COMPANY, A Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs. ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, A
Corporation,

Case No.
11029

Defendant and Respondent,

and

-wALICER BANK & TRUST

NY, A Corporation,

COMP A-

Defendant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action to recover funds disbursed on
checks drawn on appellant's account with defendant,
Walker Bank & Trust Company, after having been presented to and honored by respondent bank. The endorsements on the checks may have been forged by one Guy
E. Davis, an employee of appellant, and in some cases
the checks bore no endorsement whatsoever. Other checks
were made directly to Zions First National Bank as payee
and the proceeds from all of the checks negotiated with
Zions First National Bank are believed to have been
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deposited to the personal account of the said Guy E.
Davis.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On the 12th day of January, 1967, an Order of Dismissal without prejudice was entered in favor of respondent, Zions First National Bank, and against appellant.
Appellant then filed a Pebtion for Intermediate Appeal
which Petition was denied. On the 6th day of February,
1967, appellant filed a new Complaint against respondent, Zions First National Bank, and against defendant,
Walker Bank & Trust Company. On the 30th day of
August, 1967, an Order of Dismissal with prejudice was
entered in favor of respondent and against appellant.
From this Order and ]j-,inal Judgment this appeal is
prosecuted.
R~LIE.F'

SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment of the
Lower Court, remanding the case back to the Lower
Court for a trial on the issues of fact in dispute in this
matter.
STA'rEMENT OF FACTS
During the lH'riod lwginning September 11, 1964,
and t•nding .Tnl)' 2(i, 19\iS, tliirty-fiv(~ checks were drawn
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against appellant's checking account at defendant,
Walker Bank & Trust Company's Sugarhouse Branch.
During one sixty day period beginning April 1, 1965 and
ending May 30, 1965, twelve checks totalling $90,000.00
were honored by respondent bank and the proceeds
therefrom deposited to accounts of Guy E. Davis. The
checks were signed by Guy E. Davis, the then manager
of appellant, Sugarhouse Finance Company, and cosigned by one other person authorized to sign checks
on the chcck;ng account of appellant. Thirty-two of the
checks w<e~re made pa~·able to yarious payees and the
endorsement in each case was a signature other than the
named payee. In some cases no endorsement whatsoever
appears on the checks thus negotiated. The endorsements were made either by Davis, by someone acting in
his behalf, or perhaps by a stranger to the whole transaction. Upon presenting the checks to respondent bank
for payment, the checks were honored by tellers of
n•spondent bank without any effort having been made
to discover whether or not the endorsements were genuine and indeed in some cases without requiring any endorsement whatsoever. The amount of each check so
presented was then credited to an account or accounts
belonging to Guy E. Davis. The checks ranged in amount
from $2,300.00 to $5,550.00 and the total amount of all
checks thus honored being the sum of $150,265.00.
Three of the checks honored by Zions First National
Bank were payable directly to Zions First National Bank
as named payee. These three checks totalling $47,000.00

were negotiated during a six day period from May 21,
to May 27, 1965, and the proceeds therefrom credited
to the account or accounts belonging to Guy E. Davis.
Although attempts have been made to recover the sums
involved, the attempts have met with little success.
The Lower Court dismissed without prejudice the
original Complaint of the plaintiff on the ground that
it failed to state a claim against defendant, Zions First
National Bank, upon which relief can be granted and
on the ground that the allegations of said Complaint are
insufficient as a matter of law to state a claim against
defendant, Zions First National Bank, by reason of
Title 22, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated (1953). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint was dismissed with prejudice
on the ground that plaintiff's Complaint fails to state a
claim against defendant, Zions First National Bank, upon
which relief can be granted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FILED HEREIN FOR THE REASON THAT THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 22, CHAPTER 1,
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953), ARE INAPPLICABLE
TO THE INSTANT PROCEEDINGS IN THAT THE EMPLOYEE OF THE APPELLANT WAS NOT A FIDUCIARY
WITHIN THE l\IEANING OF THAT TERM AS USED IN
SAID ACT.
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The term "fiduciary" as used in Title 22, Chapter 1,
Utah Code Annotated, (1953) is not identical with the
meaning of that term as it is used generally, wherein
an agent is said to be in a fiduciary relationship with his
principal. It is stated by authorities on Agency that the
fiduciary capacity of an agent imposes upon an agent
a duty of loyalty of his principal. An agent must exercise his powers in accordance ·with that duty and do so
only for the benefit of his principal. It is submitted
that the fiduciary relationship required by the Fiduciaries Act is somehting more than a mere agency relationship and the fiduciary responsibilities of an agent
associated with such a relationship. Such a distinction
has been recognized by this Court as well as others. In
Tatsuno v. Kasai, 70 Utah 203, 259 P. 318 (1927), this
Court stated:
"That there was here a fiduciary relation, one
not only as generally exists between a mere principal and agent, but that of a trustee and cestui
que trust, is clearly shown in the record."
See also, In re Arbuckle's Estate, 220 P. 2d 950, 955 (Cal.
1950).
Although there are few cases in which the Courts
have attempted to define "fiduciary" as it is used in
the Fiduciaries Act, there are cases in which some distinction has been attempted to be drawn. In Harlan E.
111 oore & Co. v. Champaign National Bank, 141 N.E. 2d
97 (Ill. App. 1957), the plaintiff in count II of its Com-
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plaint had alleged the language of Section 8 of the Fiduciaries Act (our Section 22-1-8) for its contention
that by showing bad faith on the part of the defendant
bank, the bank would be liable for certain acts of an
agent of the plaintiff. rrhe appeal court affirmed a directed verdict in favor of defendant on the ground that:
"There vrns a failure of proof that -Wilkie as an
agent of plaintiff, was a fiduciary within the
meaning of Section 1, Fiduciaries Obligations Act .
. . ." Id. at 103.
The agent Wilkie had basically the same duties and
position that Guy E. Davis held with appellant in the
instant case. The clear interpretation of the holding of
the above quoted words is that there must be some
proof of fiduciary capacity in the typical sense of trustee,
before a corporate agent can be held to be within the
Act. It is interesting to note that some states have
enacted laws much more stringent than the Fiduciaries
Act for the purpose of protecting banks from liability.
In General Casualty Co. of America v. Seattle First National Bank, 256 P.2d 287 (Wash. 1953), the Court had before it a statute designed to relax some of the common
law rules under which banks were formerly held liable for
certain transactions. This statute contains the following
language:
"Where a elwck or other negotiabh, instrument
is drawn, made or endors('d in the name of or for
a corporation, finn, association, Pstate or person
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hereinafter called the principal, by an officer,
trustee, attorney, or other agent or fiduciary,
hereinafter called agent ... neither the fact that
such check or other negotiable instrument is so
drawn or endorsed, or is paid by the drawee, or
is deposited in the general account of such agent
or is given by him or its proceeds used in payment
of his private debt to the bank in which deposited
or to any other person or is negotiated by him in
any personal transaction, shall singly, or collectively be sufficient to put the depository or drawee
bank or any other person, bank, firm, or corporation, upon inquiry as to the authority of such
agent or constitute notice of an infirmity in the
check or other negotiable instrument or defect
in the title of the agent, in the absence of actual
knowledge upon the part of such bank or person
that such check or other negotiable instrument
was drawn, endorsed, negotiated, deposited or
paid without the authority of the principal."
R.C.W. 62.01.0195. (Emphasis added.)
The Washington Supreme Court in construing this
statute stated:
"This statute goes even further than the Uniform
Fiduciaries Act, 9A Uniform Laws Annotated,
19, Section 5, in relaxing the common law rule for
the purpose of protecting banks from liability."
It can be clearly sec>n that this statute is more stringent
in the protection it affords hanks than the Uniform Fi-

ducaries Act in two ways: ( 1) The statute provides that
either an agent

on fiduciary may deal with funds of the
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principal without the depository or drawee bank having
the duty to inquire into the authority by which such funds
are dealt. (2) This statute excepts from its application
only cases in which the bank has "actual knowledge"
the check was drawn, etc. without authority. The Uniform Fiduciaries Act, however, also excepts cases in
which there is knowledge of facts "\vhich indicate that the
bank's action in taking the instrument "amounts to bad
faith." Had the Utah State Legislature intended to indude all ag0nts within the rPalm of the Fiduciaries Act
it could have done so in the manner in which it was done
in the above quoted statute by the Washington State
Legislature. However, the obvious intent of the legislature was that the Fiduciaries Act should apply only to
a person holding funds in a true fiduciary capacity that is, funds held in the sense of a typical trust for
payment out by the trustee or fiduciary for certain specified purposes. Whether or not Guy E. Davis held such
a relationship with appellant in this case is a question
of fact which should be left for jury determination. Indeed, the only evidence of the relationship of Guy E.
Davis to appellant in the record of this case is an Affidavit of the vice-president of Zions First National Bank
stating that based upon records in his custody he believed
that

Gu~·

E. Davis vvas the manager of Sngarhouse Fi-

nance Company during tlw times pertinent to this litigation. rrh<'rn is no evidenCP stating or SPtting forth
the duties and autlwri t:-· of
of

manager

(J

uy K Davis in his position

of ~)ngarl1ot<s<> Finan('t~

Company.
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It is therefore submitted that Guy E. Davis was not
a fiduciary within the meaning of the Utah Fiduciaries
Act. It is further urged that the question of whether
he had the fiduciary relationship necessary to bring his
transactions within the Act is a question of fact which
could not be decided by a Judge on a Motion of Dismissal.
POINT II
THE FAILURE OF THE BANK TO REQUIRE THE PERSON AL ENDORSEl\IENT OF GUY E. DA VIS ON ALL THE
CHECKS NEGOTIATED WITH ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL
BANK WAS A BREACH OF THE CUSTOM AND PRACTICES
OF BANKING INSTITUTIONS AND AS SUCH CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE BANK.

'rhere is some dispute as to whether or not the
checks negotiated by Guy E. Davis with Zions First
National Bank were in fact forged instruments or fictitious payee checks. Plaintiff's original Complaint alleges that the checks were forgeries. Final determination of whether the checks were forgeries or fictitious
payee checks is a question of fact which must ultimately
be decided by a jury. However, for the purpose of establishing the negligence of Zions First National Bank it
is immaterial whether or not the checks are found to be
fictitious payee checks or forged instrumens. The bank
violated a duty established by custom and usage of requiring the personal endorsement of the person negoti-
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ating a check. This practice is believed followed uniformly by banking institutions whether the check presented be bearer paper or a check endorsed over to a
third party. Thus, while technically a bearer instrument
requires no endorsement for negotiation, the custom and
usage of banks has modified this rule. The reason for
the rule is self-evident. The endorsement on a bearer
instrument gives the hank negotiating the check, the
drawee bank, and the depositor a record of the person
rPceiving the proceeds therefrom.
In the instant case, if the bank had required the personal endorsement of Davis on all of the checks he negotiated, appellant could have discovered that the proceeds
of the checks were actually going to Davis rather than
the named payees and might easily have uncovered the
plot at a point where much of the misappropriated funds
might have been recovered.
Custom and usage plays an important part in the
development of Commercial Law. Indeed, the new Uniform Commercial Code expressly provides:
" ( 1) This act shall be liberally construed and a pp lied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.
(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this act
are ...
(b) to lWrmit the continued expansion of
commercial practices through custom, usage and
agreement of the parties." Utah Code Annotated,
St•ction 70A-l-l02 (1953).

11
While admittedly the Uniform Commercial Code has no
direct bearing on the instant case the above quoted section demonstrates the importance of custom and usage
to the development of Commercial Law.
Especially has cusom and usage been important in
the development of banking law. It is stated at 10 Am
J1tr 2d, Section 6 (1963) that:
"Usages and customs have played an important
role in developing the law of banking. Indeed,
much of the law of banking has grown out of
custom, and, notwithstanding the extent to which
the law has been embodied in statutes, there is
a large part of it which still remains unwritten."
Many courts have held admissible evidence of banking custom and usage for the purpose of indicating to
the jury the ordinary practice of others, in order to formulate a standard of reasonable care, although the custom
in and of itself does not necessarily establish the standard. Thus, it was held in Martin v. First National Bank,
219 SW 2d 312, 8 ALR 2d 435 (Missouri 1949) that evidence of the customs of banks in the vicinity to accept
an instruction as to the issuance of cashier's checks from
one who had been to the bank on previous occasions on
behalf of the same depositor transacting the depositor's
business with the bank, is admissible on the issue of the
bank's negligence in issuing to one who handled the
depositor's account, in exchange for checks on itself,
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cashier's checks which were then wrongfully converted.
Furthermore, it has been held that the court may take
judicial notice of certain banking customs. It is generally recognized that in order for a court to take judicial
notice of a matter there are three material requisites:
1. The matter of which the court will take judicial notice must be one of common and general
knowledge, although such knowledge need not be
nniversal;
2. The matter must be known; that is, well established and not donhtful or uncertain; and
3. The matter must be known within the limits
of the jurisdiction of the court. 89 ALR 1336.
Following these rules it has been held that a court will
take judicial notice of the fact that, when a customer of
a bank deposits with it for collection a check drawn on
an institution in another city or state, it is not anticipated
either by the customer or by the receiving bank that the
collecting bank will send one of its own officers or servants out of town to present the check to the drawee for
payment. The court held the defendant bank negligent
in forwarding of the check in question directly to the
drawee bank which was located in another town when
there was another bank in the same town. The court
took judicial notice that such a procedure was not customary among hanks. City of Douglas v. First National
Bank, 239 P. 785 (Arizona 192G). rt is tlterdore herein
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submitted that the custom and usage of banks in this
vicinity is to require the endorsement of the person presenting a check for payment whether said check be a
bearer instrument or otherwise. The violation of a custom and usage of such wide spread occurence and uniform
application certainly goes to the question of negligence
on the part of the collecting bank. Indeed, the practice
is so prevalent and known in this jurisdiction that judicial notice of such a practice is proper.
POINT III
THE CHECKS NEGOTIATED BY DAVIS MUST BE
CONSIDERED TO BE FORGED INSTRUMENTS RATHER
THAN FICTITIOUS PA YEE CHECKS. THEREFORE, THE
PROVISIONS OF TITLE 22, CHAPTER 1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) ARE INAPPLICABLE, FOR THE REASO THAT SAID ACT WAS NOT INTENDED TO RELIEVE
THE BANK OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF ASCERTAINING THE GENUINENESS OF ENDORSEMENT ON CHECKS.

Plaintiff's original Complaint alleges that the thirtytwo checks of which a list is contained in Exhibit "A"
of plaintiff's original Complaint, contain forged endorsements. Since there has been no Answer filed by the
defendants in this action and no other evidence introduced to contradict this allegation, at this point in the
litigation it must be deemed that the endorsements on
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said checks were indeed forgeries. However, there are
other compelling reasons for believing that said endorsements are indeed forgeries and that the checks are thus
forged instruments rather than fictitious payee checks.
While it is readily admitted that Guy E. Davis did
have authority to draw checks on the deposits of Sugarhouse Finance Company it was required that such checks
have a second signature before they were valid. All of
the checks negotiated by Guy E. Davis with Zions First
National Bank did in fact bear one other signature than
that of Guy E. Davis. The question of whether a check
is a forged instrument or fictitious payee check is determined by the intent of the person making it so payable.
Utah Code Annotated, §44-1-10 (3) (1953). There is no
evidence on record as to the intent of Davis or the
second person signing the thirty-two checks negotiated
with Zions First National Bank. In a similar case in
which it was required that two signatures be upon the
check before it was negotiable, the Court stated the following:
"In our opinion, the difficulty in the instant case
is, in view of the facts, created by the theoretical
significance attached to the second signature. We
do not question the proposition that the intention
·with which the check is drawn is all important to
a decision as to whether or not it was drawn to a
fictitious payee. V\T e reassert said principle.
There is, however, no more reason to say that
the intent must be that of a co-signer than to say
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it must be that of the actual maker, to-wit: the
corporation. The controlling intent is that of the
person who within the scope of his authority does
the final thing which gives vitality to the check
or who places it in circulation." Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust
Co., 1 Cal. App. 2d 694, 37 P.2d 483 (1934).
It is true that in that case the controlling intent was
found to be that of the defrauding employee for the
reason that the second person signing the check was held

to be a mere automaton who had no real intent that
could be attributed to the corporation. In the instant
case there is no evidence whatsoever that the second person signing the checks was a party to the fraud or that
said person had any other intent than that the proceeds
of the checks should go to named payees. There is evidence that the second person signing the check did in
fact know personally many of the named payees in said
checks and that said person intended fully that the
named payees should receive the proceeds therefrom.
Viewed in this light the thirty-two checks must be considered to contain forged endorsements and are not
bearer paper within the meaning of Fictitious Payee
Doctrine. Certainly, the determination of the intent of
both Guy E. Davis and the second person signing said
checks is a question of fact that may not be decided by
a Judge considering only the question of whether a
Complaint states a valid claim.
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A second reason supporting the allegation that the
endorsements on the checks were forgeries involves the
definition of a fictitious payee check and the effect of
the Fictitious Payee Doctrine upon the duty of a bank
to ascertain the genuineness of endorsements and the
right of the person presenting the check to receive payment therefor. Assuming that the checks in question
were in fact fictitious payee instruments, does the bank
have no duty to ascertain the genuineness of endorsements on an instrument when the bank has no knowledge
that the check is a fictitious payee check at the time of
negotiating said check~ In other words, the question
that must be decided is whether or not the bank has the
duty to ascertain the genuineness of endorsements or to
require an endorsement on a check which it does not
know to be a fictitious payee check at the time of negotiation. Certainly an intermediary bank which received
a check on a forged endorsement and collects it from
the drawee bank is liable to the drawer of the check for
his loss. 10 Arn. Jur. 2d §G29. The logical interpretation
of the Fictitious Payee Doctrine would require that the
bank be aware that the check is a fictitious payee check
at the time of negotiation. If the bank does not know
that the check is a fictitious payee check at the time of
negotiation the bank is still held to the duy to inquire
as to the genninPness of endorsements on said check, the
same as it wonlJ if the check were a check with a real
named payee.
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Furthermore, when the bank in the regular course
of business stamps upon the check its guarantee of
prior endorsements and transmits the check to the drawee
hank for collection it is a ridiculous result to believe
that the bank is guaranteeing the endorsement of a fictitious person. While there is no contract relationship
between a depositor and an intermediary bank accepting a check for negotiation, the depositor is the third
party beneficiary of the intermediary bank's guarantee
of prior endorsements to the drawee bank. Therefore,
if the bank stamps upon a check its guarantee of prior
endorsements the fact that the check is a fictitious payee
check has no bearing upon the rights of the depositor
to hold liable the intermediary bank for acts in making
payment on said check. The intermediary bank by stamping its guarantee of prior endorsements is estopped from
at a later point alleging that the check is a fictitious
payee check.
For these reasons it can be seen that a bank does
have the duty to ascertain the genuineness of endorsements at the time of negotiation and further to ascertain
whether or not a check is a fictitious payee check and
thus bearer paper at that time. If the bank pays the
check and transmits it with its guarantee of prior endorsements the check's endorsement must then be
held to havl:' bePn a forged endorsement. See Standard
Acc. Ins. Co. v. Pfllecchia, 15 N.J. 162, 104 A.2d 288
(1954).

18
It is therefore submitted that the checks were in
fact checks containing forged endorsements ratht>r than
fictitious payt>e checks, and that the provisions of the
Utah Fiduciaries Act do not apply to a transaction in
which such a forged instrument is involved. In the
Commissioner's prefatory note to the Uniform Fiduciary
Act, 9B Uniform Laws Annotated (1966), at page 22~
it is said:

''The general pnrpost> of the Act is to facilitate
the performance by fiduciaries of their obligations, rather than to favor any particular class
of persons dealing with fiduciaries."
In order to facilitate that purpose, it was necessary to
relieve a bank from the duty of inquiring into the authority of a fiduciary to draw a check, to transfer a
check, or to deposit a check. For example, if the checks
in this case had been made payable to cash, Guy E.
Davis keeping the cash proceeds, the bank probably
"\rnuld not be liable. Also, if the checks were made payable to John Doe who cashed them and gave the money
to Davis, thf~ bank probably would not be liable. Even
assuming that Guy E. Davis vvas a fiduciary within the
meaning of the Act, which is not admitted, where a
fiduciary check is rt>gular on its face a bank would not
necessaril~· lw liahlP for an:-· breach of duty by the fiduciary. But in this east-, it is allPgt>d that tlw checks
were not regular on tlwir face; that the.v do bt>ar forged
endorsPmPnts. Pnd,,r tliP Fiduciaries Act, a bank may
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be relieved from any duty of inquiring into the extent
of the authority of a named fiduciary, but all of the
other duties of the bank towards its depositors remain
intact, including, the duty of determining the genuineness
of endorsements. Nothing in the Act purports to relieve
any bank from that duty. It is therefore submitted that
the payment of the checks was made on forged endorsements and that the provisions of the Utah Fiduciaries
Act are not applicable.
POINT IV
EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE
22, CHAPTER 1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953) ARE
APPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT PROCEEDINGS, THE
LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S
AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR THE REASON THAT THE
QUESTION OF WHETHER RESPONDENT BANK ACTED
IN BAD FAITH IS A QUESTION OF FACT PROPERLY
THE SUBJECT OF JURY DETERMINATION.

Even assuming that either by operation of law or
through a fact determination Guy E. Davis was found
to have had the requisite relationship with Sugarhouse
Finance Company to bring him within the requirements
of the Utah Fiduciaries Act, the question of whether
or not bad faith was shown the part of the bank is one
not properly the subject of a motion for dismissal. The
qlwstion of bad faith is om• which should be determined
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the triers of fact rather than a judge considering
only whether or not a Complaint states a valid claim.
There is sufficient evidence pointing to the fact that
the respondent bank did act in bad faith to give the
jury ample evidence to consider that question.
h~-

In discussing the requisites necessary for a showing of bad faith one court defined "bad faith" as knowledge by a responsible agency, officer, or employee of
the bank of an incriminating state of facts, short of
actual knowledge of the breach of trust, but conscious
of it, and aiding and abetting or acquiescing, in the
breach. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. National Newark & East Building Co., 175 A. 609 (N.J. 1934). Furthermore, it was held in another case that circumstances
showing a transfer not in the ordinary course of business
were sufficient to show bad faith in the meaning of ~()
of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act. Norristown-Penn. Trust
Co. v. Middleton, 150 A. 885 (Penn. 1930). In that case a
firm of stock brokers received a draft in payment of
the individual debt to them of the drawer. The draft was
drawn by the treasurn of a bank on its funds in another
bank payablP to a fictitious person, and was delivered
by the treasurer to the brokers, with the endorsement
of the name of the fictitious person, and without the
personal endorse>11wnt of the drawer. In discussing the
application of ~G of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act (our
~22-1-6) in discnssing "·hether or not "bad faith" ·within
the meaning of tht> act was shown by the stock brokers
in accepting the clH'C'k tht- Court stated:
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"vVhile notice of defect in title to paper, or bad
faith, is not presumed, the fact may be established bv circumstances. Where fraud in the inception of a transaction appeared, the conclusion
of notice to the holder may be justified, and the
fact that the manner of negotiation is unusual, as
here, and not the way ordinarily followed in the
course of business, is some evidence of bad faith.
In this case, the maker was the treasurer, whom
the defendants were bound to know had no right
to use the bank's draft to pay his own debts. It
was produced from his possession to another unknown "~ho ·was named as payee, who seemingly
endorsed the paper, and defendants accepted it
without the individual endorsement of Maurer
(the treasurer). The jury might find from the
use of the draft for a personal debt by the officer
who executed it, and to whom it had been returned,
evidence of improper conduct by the transferor."
Id. at 888.
The court held, therefore, that the circumstances showing
a trans£ er not in the ordinary course of business were
sufficient to show bad faith within the meaning of ~6
of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act.
The analog)' to the instant case can readily be seen.
Gny E. Davis delivered to res11ondent bank certain checks
made ont to either fictitious persons or persons not intendt>d to receive the proceeds of the checks. The respond bank did not reqnire that Gu>' E. Davis personally
endorse the checks with his name. Such circumstances
are> not in tlw ordinary course of business as practiced

by banks in this area. Considering the multiplicity of
transactions in which thirty-two checks were thus negotiated by Guy E. Davis through respondent bank and the
large amounts involved, all amounts being in excess of
$2,000.00 and some being in amounts as high as $5,000.00,
the ordinary course of business would certainly dictate
that the bank demand of Davis that he personally endorse
each check before its negotiation. The failure of the bank
to require the personal endorsement of Guy Davis on all
of the thirty-two checks thus negotiated must certainly
be evidence showing ba<l faith on the part of the bank.
Bad faith does not require actual knowledge of the use
of the funds of the principal by the agent for purposes
outside the scope of his agency. As can be seen in the
New Amsterdam Casualty case cited above, bad faith
requires only knowledge of an incriminating state of
facts from which it reasonably might be infrrred that
the agent is not acting honestly.
It is submitted that the multiplicity of transactions
and the amounts of the checks involved together with
the fact that the bank did not require proper endorsements as is required in the ordinary course of business,
amounts to a knowledge by the bank or its agent of just
such an incriminating state of facts and that such state
of facts should certainly show bad faith on the part of
the bank. It is therdore submitted that the Lower Court
erred in granting respondent's Motion for Dismissal.
There are facts snffieient to point toward a showing of
bad faith on the part of respondent bank even though
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it should be found that provisions of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act apply to the facts in the instant proceedings.
POINT V
THE
THE

L0 WER

SECOND

COURT

CAUSE

OF

ERRED

IN

DISMISSING

ACTION

OF

PLAINTIFF'S

ORIGINAL AND AMENDED COMPLAINTS FOR THE REASON THAT TITLE 22, CHAPTER I, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, (1953) EXPRESSLY PROVIDES THAT THE NAMED
PAYEE OF A CHECK IS LIABLE TO THE PRINCIPAL IF
SUCH PAYEE HAS ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE
PROCEEDS THEREFROM ARE FOR THE PERSONAL BENEFIT OF THE FIDUCIARY, IF THE FIDUCIARY IN FACT
COMMITS A BREACH OF HIS OBLIGATION IN DRAWING
OR DELIVERING THE INSTRUMENT.

Plaintiff's original and amended Complaints both
allege that the proceeds from the three checks negotiated with Zions First National Bank in which Zions
First National Bank was a named payee were deposited
to the account or accounts of Guy E. Davis in Zions
First National Bank. Section 22-1-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953) expressly provides that the payee of a check
drawn by a fiduciary is not bound to inquire whether
the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation
as fiduciary in drawing or delivering the instrument.
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However, a proviso of that section states:
"If, however, such instrument is payable to a
personal creditor of the fiduciary and delivered
to the creditor in payment of, or as security for,
a personal debt of the fiduciary to the actual
knowledge of the creditor, or is drawn and delivfred in any transaction known by the payee to
1H? for the benefit of the fiditciary, the creditor or
other payee is liable to the principal, if the fidu.ciary in fact commits a breach of his obligation
as ficfociary in drawing or delivering the instrument." (Emphasis added.)

A proper application of this section would require that
Zions First National Bank upon being presented with a
check in which Zions First National Bank was a named
payee be liable for misappropriated funds of such a
fiduciary if, in fact, Zions First National Bank had actual
knowledge that the proceeds of the check were to go for
the benefit of the fiduciary. Since the original and
Amended Complaints of the plaintiff allege that the
proceeds from the three checks in which Zions First
National Bank was a named payee went directly into
the account or accounts of Guy E. Davis it must be
deemed that the bank had actual knowledge that such
proceeds were to go to the personal benefit of Guy E.
Davis. In the absence of any allegations or facts to the
contrary, the bank must be held to be liable for the proceeds wrongfully paid to Guy E. Davis and the Order
of Dismissal of the Lower Conrt in both the original and
Amended Complaints was thus improper.
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CONCLUSION
The test of the correctness and validity of an Order
of Dismissal for failure to state a claim is whether in
the light most favorable to plaintiff, and with every
intendment regarded in his favor, the complaint is sufficient to constitute a valid claim. Barron & H olt.zoff,
FPderal Practice & ProCPdure §356 (Rules Edition 1960).
It is appellant's contention that an Order of Dismissal was improper in plaintiff's original Complaint
for two reasons: First, the record is replete with allegations and facts, which if taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff, does make out a valid claim. Second,
the Lower Court incorrectly construed the purpose and
intent of the Utah Fiduciaries Act, which act has no
application to the facts and allegations of the instant
case.

Furthermore, the Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's
Amended Complaint was improperly granted because
the record shows sufficient facts and allegations to make
a valid Complaint, if such facts are taken in the light
most favorable to plaintiff.
Therefore, appellant respectfully submits that the
decision of the Lower Court should be reversed and
the matter remanded for further proceedings in accordance with law.
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Respectfully suhmitted,
Bruce K Coke
William J. And<>rson
BEASLIN,NYGAARD, COKE
& YTNCENT

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
Sugarhouse Finawe Company

